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LEADERSHIP IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR EFFICIENT EXPRESSION 
by 
Ed Wingenbach 
The House of Representatives is often denigrated by the media and the Executive as an 
inefficient and overly decentralized institution which is incapable of effectively representing the 
citizens of the United States. The criticisms seem to center on the political cowardice of the 
Representatives and a lack of strong leadership within the body itself. These sort of widespread 
public perceptions are dangerous to the very essence of democratic government - confidence 
in a citizen's personal representation. If Congress in general, and the House in particular, lacks 
the respect of the electorate, the legitimacy of representative democracy itself is at stake. 
Fortunately, thecriticismsofCongressionalleadershiparenotaswarrantedastheymightappear. 
Leadership and political fortitude do exist on Capitol Hill, but in a way that is more accommodating 
than charismatic, more competent than compelling. It is a style ofleadership more compatible to 
and consistent with a recently democratized institution. It is a leadership learning to use the new 
tools of reform and creating a more expressive, reactive, and, consequently, less efficient House 
of Representatives. The advantages of this new approach far outweigh the difficulties it creates. 
Unfortunately, the primary difficulty is the creation of a perception of failure and lack of direction 
among the electorate. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the real and developing nature of 
political leadership in the House and dispel some of the unwarranted criticism which Congress 
has weathered in recent years. 
Leadership in the House of Representatives is no longer restricted to a few committee 
chairpersons and the three major Leadership positions, namely the Speaker, Majority Leader, and 
Majority Whip. Due to the proliferation of subcommittees and these committees' increasing 
importance, formal leadership positions with real and discernible power are available to more 
than a third of all House Representatives. This expanded potential for leadership can, however, 
be deceptive. The rapid turnover in subcommittee personnel and inability of subcommittee chairs 
to wield influence effectively in an atmosphere of greater equality has, in many senses, presented 
greater opportunity for effective Party leadership. Far from diluting the power of the senior ranks 
of the Party Leadership, recent reforms have strengthened the potential for leadership perhaps 
to its highest level since Speaker Joe Cannon's reign. 
Today's House of Representatives is very different from any in the past. Its members and the 
party organization of which they are a part are of a unique nature ( unique,at least, in the history 
of the House). There are many obstacles to a leadership style that is dominant or demanding. 
Because of these obstacles, it is unrealistic to expect leadership to live up to the examples set by 
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men such as Sam Rayburn - the external tools for control are simply not present. Some of these 
barriers are due to the structure of national parties, others to the nature and motivation of 
members. The inherent weakness of the party structures lies mostly in the campaign-and 
campaign-funding process. Party organizations do not control local nominations to any real 
extent; the party is greatly lacking in funds which can be dispersed to members for campaigns, 
and there is no functioning system of public campaign funding for the House (Baker 27). The lack 
of control over nominations essentially prevents the national parties from screening the potential 
members of the House, a process that would aid in insuring party loyalty. The lack of party 
campaign funding or any viable public funding system means, obviously, that the candidates must 
seek other sources of revenue. As a result, the party has little direct responsibility for the election 
of any candidate; thus, the candidates are less beholden to the party for their position, and, in many 
cases, support interests with which the party is not necessarily in agreement. When these points 
are combined with the irreverence of the modem junior member towards the leadership, leading 
becomes a difficult task indeed. Expecting dominant leadership in such a situation is not only 
irresponsible, but almost inconceivable. "Instead let us think about the challenges of generalship 
in an army of colonels or of heading an academic department in which everyone is tenured" 
(Baker, 27). It is these challenges which must temper expectations of House leadership. 
Interestingly enough, the facts seem to belie this bleak picture- leadership is indeed occurring, 
and, in some instances, defying the low expectations one might have for such an unfocused body. 
Leadership and the Reforms of the Seventies 
The extensive reforms of the early seventies laid the groundwork for expansion of modem 
House leadership. These reforms arose from a variety ofreasons and accomplished both intended 
and surprising results. The major impetus for the reforms appears to lie in the influx of young, 
activist Democratic politicians during and after the Vietnam War and the Watergate Crisis. These 
newer, more irreverent House members felt little need to wait their twenty years in order to make 
an impact on legislation, and were also frustrated with the stranglehold Conservative Democrats 
held on committees important to activist legislation. 
The obvious primary goal of the early seventies' reform was to disperse power within the 
House in a manner more equitable than the seniority in committee method that dominated 
previously. The mechanism was the series of reforms known as Hansen I, II, and III, as well as 
the Democratic Caucus reforms of 197 4 and 1975. These were directed primarily at weakening 
the committee chairpersons, strengthening the Party's effectiveness, and dispersing power to 
subcommittees (see chart in Jones, p. 123). This effectively accommodated members' desires for 
easier access to power and representation in the body. 
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These reforms seem, at first examination, to indicate a corresponding decline in the efficiency 
of the legislature. As it turns out, it may be possible thatthe first does not always require a decrease 
in the second. Jones characterizes the uniqueness of these reforms in the following way: 
Whereas earlier reform periods appeared to swing in one 
direction or the other - toward centralization or decentralization, 
responsibility or responsiveness - theelaborate changes enacted 
in the 1970's seemed to go in both directions at once Gones 121). 
This statement arises from a comparison of actions like the Hansen reforms and the Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 197 4. While the Hansen reforms were clearly decentralizing 
leadership, the Budget Act's primary result was an integration of decision making powers and an 
increase in the strength of the Speaker (who appoints the members of the Budget Committee). 
The result of such mixed signals is not, as might be expected, chaos, but what Jones calls 
"Channelled Expressiveness" Gones 122). By dispersing power to the subcommittees, and, in 
effect, expanding the power franchise greatly by circumventing the committee chairpersons, a 
much greater degree of expression was possible to House members. At the same time, because 
of the lack of committee leadership and the potential chaos of dispersed power, stronger 
leadership at the Party and Speaker level is required to maintain House functions. In this way, the 
allegedly conflicting desires for both representation and efficiency were being bolstered at the 
expense of the power of the committee chairs. 
Some Informal Powers of Leadership 
While it is clear that the dispersion of power was the main thrust of the reforms, it is not at 
all clear that "Channelled Expressiveness" was the goal; however, thi~ term does seem to describe 
best what occurred as a result of the reforms. An area where this is particularly evident is the floor 
management of almost any given bill. Whereas prior to the early seventies the House had a 
tendency to defer to a committee's judgement on the floor, the decline of committee chair power 
and vocalness of newer members led to an increasing lack of deference to any committee 
recommendation, and, as a result, a great deal of legislating on the floor (Sinclair, "Strategies" 
183). This is a symptom of the inability of largely inexperienced subcommittee chairs to manage 
a bill on the floor effectively, produce excellent legislation, or assemble a majority. This was not 
a problem for the committee chairpersons of the past, who were able to rely on their own 
experience and political ability to pass a bill. The new, dispersed and ineffective (at least on the 
floor) subcommittee leadership must either turn to the Party leadership for aid or risk the death 
of their bills. Says Kenneth Shepsle, 
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Final legislation today is less the result of specialized consideration 
by experts than it is the product of whoever is skilled at assembling floor 
majorities. On some occasions, as in olden times, this may in fact be a 
wilycommittee or subcommittee chair; but on other occasions it may 
well be an agent of the Speaker, or of the majority party caucus ... 
(Shepsle 480). 
This sort of problem, and the possible solutions which require cooperation with the leadership, 
exhibit quite well the divergent trends of expression and integration bringing one another about 
in possibly unintended manners. 
This inability of most subcommittee chairs to manage their own bills successfully has created 
an atmosphere which requires effective Party Leadership in more ways than the incidental type 
discussed above. Coordination by the leadership is imperative to the successful passage of just 
about all legislation. According to Davidson, leadership is indispensable to the current House in 
providing three major services: consultation, inclusion, and routinization (Davidson 361). They 
are consultative in that the leadership is best able to provide channels through which all 
legislation must pass, and facilitate the process. They are inclusive in that they supply and 
moderate to a large extent the arenas in which the legislative battles are fought. Finally, they 
supply and maintain routine by communicating and maintaining the procedures and precedents 
of the Congress. 
Baker points to a different set of techniques which the leadership uses to exert influence on 
and foster favorable legislation. He points to the abilities of the leadership to use their stature and 
position to provide services from outside of the House to which rank-and-file representatives have 
little access. These are the ability to attract policy experts for testimony on bills, the ability to . 
provide political cover through public relations in the party caucus and party committees such as 
the Committee on Party Effectiveness, and the tendency of the media to seek out the leadership 
for answers and coverage (Baker 29-31). These are all functions which the powerful chairmen of 
the past could preform for their own committees but which now fall to the party leaders. Such 
services are essential to House members if any action is to be successful. In the current House, 
no group can supply these essential techniques and information. In a very real sense, leadership 
is responsible for managing the procedures of the House that allow it to function coherently and 
cohesively. It is through these basic skills that the leadership has made itself more and more 
essential to the membership of the House. 
The leadership is able to use this "management" position to both foster legislation of which 
it approves, and to set the legislative priorities it wishes to see realized. If we are to accept the fact 
that the leadership can no longer completely control originating legislation through powerful 
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committee chairs, it is immediately apparent that legislation will originate with much less control 
or guidance from above. This also results in a more diversified selection of legislation. The 
leadership's role then becomes one of discrimination and cultivation. From this fertile garden of 
potential laws, the leadership is able to select those proposals which are most amenable to the 
leadership's program and use their resources to help move the legislation along. In a sense, "the 
policy-shaping activities that the best members pursued would be underwritten by their party's 
leadership-not simply tolerated but fostered and cultivated" (Baker, 28). While such a policy is 
less certain than the dictation of a legislative program from above, the results, if the technique is 
properly applied, will be generally the same. The leadership is able to choose the priorities of the 
House through the extension and retention of its special skills (Sinclair, "1980's" 312). Another 
result of the fractured operation of subcommittee floor management is introduction of many more 
floor amendments than ever before. These amendments are often complex and the amount of 
time available for review before voting inadequate. Only the leadership is in a position to have a 
likely understanding of most amendments and the ability to get out succinct information quickly 
in the chamber (Sinclair, "Strategies" 189). The members are forced to rely on the leadership's 
capsule summaries in order to decide their direction on many amendments. This gives the 
leadership yet another tool for both influencing the outcome of floor debate and making itself 
procedurally indispensable. 
The Expanding Formal Powers of the Leadership 
The reforms of the early seventies did more than create mere opportunities for the Party 
Leadership to influence the House - they actually granted the leadership, specifically the 
Speaker, quite a few important formal powers. One of the most important was the change which 
allowed the Speaker to appoint eight members of the Steering and Policy Committee. These 
members, when combined with the four leadership positions already on the committee, give the 
leadership a majority of the seats on this extremely important committee. It is a healthy 
assumption to say that this is the most important committee of the Democratic Party Caucus, and 
that those who sit on the committee are respected and influential. The Steering and Policy 
Committee becomes even more formidable when one realizes how extensive its power is when 
it comes to committee appointments and positions. With so many leadership positions available 
in the subcommittees, almost every committee assignment decision is important. This is 
obviously not a body to be ignored. The speaker, through the fact that he virtually controls the 
committee, is able to use this widely-respected/feared group to influence legislation viewed 
favorably by the speaker. This is done through the use of Steering Committee endorsements of 
certain pieces oflegislation. "A Steering and Policy Committee endorsement signals the member-
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ship that the bill is seen as important and a party matter" (Sinclair 193). Since the Steering and 
Policy Committee takes Party loyalty into account when assigning committee positions, an 
indication that a bill is an important partisan matter to the committee is a pronouncement with 
teeth. 
A second powerful tool of the Speaker is his ability to control (subject to caucus approval) the 
majority members of the House Rules Committee. While Rules does not always go along with the 
Speaker's wishes, he exerts a considerable influence. The use of restrictive rules that aid the 
leadership's agenda has increased greatly over the ten years between 1978 and 1988, by almost 
300% (Davidson 358). This is a clear indication thatthe Speaker and the leadership is able to dictate 
the course of legislation in a manner much more direct than the unsure business of creating a 
majority coalition. The leadership is also able to create special conditions for the order of 
consideration of versions of bills, referred to as "King of the Mountain" rules. Such a rule allows 
the leadership to place its version last in a series of considerations and then stipulate that the last 
version receiving a majority will be adopted. This, of course, often results in the leadership's most 
favored version being adopted-yet another example of the small advantages ofleadership which 
add up to truly effective power as a whole. 
A third power the Speaker can use is the creation of Ad Hoc Committees for the study of 
particular issues. Such creations are the sole province of the Speaker and he retains the right to 
appoint both members and jurisdiction to these temporary committees. While the speaker is 
usually careful to avoid stepping on a standing committee's toes by infringing upon their area of 
jurisdiction, the ability to form Ad Hoc Committees serves as a check and a warning to the 
standing committee system. It also gives the Speaker power to manipulate legislation in such a 
way that it must b~ reported within certain limits and in a form that the Speaker wishes to see. This 
power, though not always successful, can be potent when used properly and supplies a legislative 
safety valve and mechanism to encourage responsible conduct in committees accessible only to 
the leadership (Sinclair 192). 
A more common method of controlling the path of legislation than the Ad Hoc Committee, 
is the use of multiple referral. The Speaker has a right, in a multiple referral, to set deadlines for 
consideration (after the first committee), to integrate diverse aspects of the House's newer, more 
inclusive bills, to gain credit by protecting jurisdictional turf, and to control/ coordinate the entire 
legislative process in a direct manner. 'This expansion in internal roles and techniques has taken 
the form of an expansion in the activities and leverage of the majority party leadership" (Collie and 
Cooper 265). These powers are, in combination with other techniques already mentioned, used 
to further influence the path of legislation and process of cultivation that is so essential to creating 
a leadership program in the modern House. 'This multiple referral authority ties the Speaker 
more directly into committee decision-making than perhaps at any time since the 1910 revolt 
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against Speaker Cannon" (Davidson 359). Such intrusive and inclusive scheduling power, in 
combination with a cooperative Rules Committee and the ability to control entirely the creation 
and jurisdiction of Ad Hoc Committees, gives the speaker unprecedented (at least in the last 80 
years) power over the internal procedural workings of the House. 
Another power of the Speaker is the ability to form ad hoc Task Forces. While this is not a 
specific legislative power, it is an ability utilized officially only by the Speaker. Task forces are, 
simply, party committees charged with insuring the passage of a particular piece of legislation. 
This entails both an intimate knowledge of the bill and the creation of floor majorities to pass it. 
A task force created to handle an important bill takes some of the load off the Speaker and 
leadership's shoulders, while, at the same time, increasing commitment and party loyalty among 
junior members, i.e., their "socialization to followership norms" (Garand 391). Task forces serve 
as an example of action serving both the goal of expression and integration. The junior members 
of the House are made to feel more significant and powerful, and, therefore, more satisfied with 
their position in the party. It is interesting to note that membership on task forces increased a 
member's party support by 7 to 10 percent among junior members, while there was less effect as 
seniority of task force members increased (Garand 392). So, while members in task forces feel 
as though their expressive needs are being met, party coherence and followership, and, thus, 
integrative leadership is strengthened. 
The Effect of Budget Politics 
If greater centralization leads to more effective or powerful leadership, an important question 
to examine is the effect of centralizing and decentralizing issues. A decentralized House requires 
an ability for members to act and create legislation fairly independently. Independent legislation 
requires an ability to spend money without being overly concerned with spending as an issue. If 
the power to spend money is vested in authorizing committees, acquiring and spending money 
requires less of an ability to manipulate the Appropriations Committee and garner floor support. 
"Much of the decentralization of the 1960's and 1970's was accompanied by a weakening of the 
Appropriations Committee's hold over spending ... " (Davidson 355). Unfortunately for those who 
prefer a decentralized House, the money is no longer there for the spending, and the Budget and 
Appropriations Committees are playing a larger and more essential role in decision making. This, 
of course, results in more and more centralized decision making and, concurrently, a rise in 
leadership opportunities. Davidson compares the House to a corporation experiencing financial 
difficulties-when money gets short, centralize and streamline your decision process in order to 
cut down on waste and reduplication. 
Budget restrictions have changed the House in many other substantive ways, mostly in the 
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direction of greater potential leadership. One of the most noticeable changes has been the 
increase in the size of bills introduced (and, correspondingly, the decrease in the amount of bills 
introduced). This greater incorporation of materials in larger bills is reflected in the fact that 
representatives introduce only a third as many measures as they did a generation ago (Davidson 
352). These larger bills have one major purpose, and that is to disperse the blame for difficult cuts 
as widely as possible. It also contributes to the inability of floor managers to control bills their 
committees have introduced due to the sheer size and amendment potential of each larger bill. 
These trends towards greater centralization to avoid blame open greater opportunities for the 
leadership to exercise influence. "Continuing resolutions [the major type of budgeting bill] have 
the indirect effect of recentralizing authority in fewer hands" (Oleszek 75). This simply reinforces 
the idea that some sort of expertise and influence is now, more than ever, necessary for the 
passage of legislation. 
Who is it that benefits most from this fiscally dictated recentralization? The obvious answer 
to this query is that those who control the budgeting process do. Who controls the budgeting 
process? Not surprisingly, the party leadership does. The control is not direct-the party 
leadership does not directly shape the bills in committee or on the floor-but it is extremely 
present. That this is so can be confirmed through a simple examination of the budget process. 
Budget politics, as has been shown above, tends to increase the size and decrease the amount 
of legislaion introduced during any given session. In fact, it is possible to describe the House as 
functioning under a Four Bill system-budget, continuing resolutions, supplemental appropria-
tions, and reconciliation packages (Dodd and Oppenheimer 48). A vast majority of the legislation 
of any given session is contained in these four types of bills. All legislation requiring funds (which, 
of course, is a majority of legislation) must be funded through one of these bills. In essence 
legislation is crippled without approval in one of the four types of budgeting bills. The four 
committees which have the most decisive, and, in fact, total, influence on budget bills are 
Appropriations, Ways and Means, Budget, and the ever-present Rules Committee. These, not 
surprisingly, are the elite, restricted committees of the House. This leads Dodd and Oppenheimer 
to their conclusion that there is a "New Oligarchy" in the House which consists of the majority 
party leadership and the committee chairs of these four important committees (Dodd and 
Oppenheimer 39). This centralization of power is further confirmed when the composition of the 
Steering and Policy Committee is examined: for example, all four chairs were members of this 
committee in the 97th Congress. If the speaker appoints Steering and Policy, the four elite 
committee chairs are on Steering and Policy, and Steering and Policy controls most important 
appointments, it becomes clear just how much power this "New Oligarchy" can wield. They 
control the purse strings, have the ability to manage the huge omnibus budget bills, reconcile 
interests, and make committee appointments. When this is coupled with the increases in formal 
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power granted to the speaker over the last twenty years, especially his ability to appoint the 
Steering and Policy Committee, the amount of potential leadership avenues and control becomes 
manifestly greater. 
Another aspect of the budgeting process is the tendency of budget and spending legislation 
to polarize party conflicts. The interests of both parties require budget proposals favorable to their 
particular agendas, and the voting on budget legislation tends towards party lines. "In a Congress 
where so many factions and pressures cross party lines, this situation dramatically shows the 
capacity of budgetary politics to polarize issues and factions" (Davidson 356). Obviously, such 
polarization is beneficial to the Party Leadership. The rank and file members do not have access 
to the opposing party's proposals, and, if they wish to see their budget interests met, it is a 
requirement that the party members play along with the leadership. This will have two results: 
first, the leadership's position as the only people who can effectively manage legislation by 
harmonizing diverse interests (even if the diverse interests are constrained to go along by the 
restrictions of the process), and, secondly, the leadership is able to amass favors and debts for use 
in later political maneuvering. That this is true is attested to by recent statistics. For example, in 
the 99th Congress 59% of all roll-call votes were along partisan lines, which was the highest level 
since World War II; in 1987 this rose to 64 %; and, finally, party unity in 1987 was an astounding 
81% (Dodd and Oppenheimer 42). While statistics can be deceiving, these are fairly convincing 
numbers. Those who control the budget process can take advantage of this polarization to shape 
legislation and quickly advance beyond their peers in influence. When this control is coupled with 
a leadership which is already powerful due to both the inability of others to lead and expanded 
formal powers, the House Leadership can become a formidable force indeed. 
Conclusions 
A graph of leadership in the House might show a consistent decline in effectiveness since 
1910, with a possible jump during Sam Rayburn's tenure as speaker. Common wisdom seems to 
point to the current leadership as the weakest and most ineffectual at any point in the current 
century. Such common wisdom seems, however, to belie the real facts of leadership ability and 
potential in the current House. The combination of dispersed power in the subcommittee system, 
inexperienced floor management, an increase in formal leadership opportunities, and the 
importance of budget politics indicate that the potential for powerful leadership is greater now 
than at any time since Cannon. If leadership is not effective, it can only be because of an inability 
or unwillingness to exercise these powers and grasp leadership opportunities. Yet Sinclair (and 
others) indicate that "the leadership has been very skilled in using its resources to cope with the 
problems created by rule and norm changes and by heavy membership turnover" (Sinclair 203). 
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The perception that leadership is weak probably arises from the surface appearance of disorga-
nization created by the greater expressive and representative options open to more members of 
the House. This leads many observers to the conclusion that the House can not get anything done 
effectively. Such a conclusion is simply inaccurate. It is apparent from recent experience that a 
determined and skillful leadership is able not only to control legislation but actually implement 
a program from above-a seemingly impossible task, even given the expanded abilities of the 
leadership. The most convincing example is the tenure of Speaker Jim Wright and his leadership 
team. Wright built on the power base developed by Tip O'Neill to truly control the House in the 
manner of an effective and powerful leader. In his first full term as Speaker, he did something 
which no Speaker had done in years-he presented a legislative agenda and used his centralized 
control to try and push it through the House (Dodd and Oppenheimer 55). While this is not the 
place for a detailed examination ofW right' s methods, it is sufficient to note that he took advantage 
of the resources available to him in an extremely effective manner. In fact, "(t]he House passed 
all the items on the Speaker's agenda, and, despite a frequently deadlocked Senate and hostile 
Presidency, most became law" (Sinclair, "1980's" 327). If leadership in the House is to be judged 
by an ability to shape the legislative agenda and insure that the final products resemble the 
leadership's initial policy goals, it is clear from both the theoretical perspective (i.e., the powers 
and areas where influence is greatest for the leadership rest in the prevailing circumstances and 
rules) and reality (i.e., Wright's legislative program) that strong leadership is eminently possible 
in the modern House of Representatives. 
Perhaps it is just a matter of the House growing into its potential to be an effective and 
representational body without sacrificing either. According to Shepsle, "[T] he Congress that has 
emerged from the reforms of the 1970's has not, even a decade later, settled down into the stable 
institution it was in the 1950's" (Shepsle 479). Calls for stronger leadership (which seems to mean 
domineering leadership) may only delay the evolution of the House as an effective and efficient 
institution. As one House member put it, 
Strong leadership? Yeah, I love to hear these guys talk about it, and 
then, five minutes later, they're shouting about democracy- and they 
don't even understand the paradox (Loomis 171). 
The House appears to be moving towards an institution where effective but responsive leadership 
is exercised in a manner constructive to realizing, or at least considering, all interests. This 
balance between the danger of an efficient leadership dictating terms to an unheard membership 
and an unguided, atomized, and ineffective House is being reached in a measured but effective 
pace. The members are able to propose legislation almost without limits, giving them at least an 
impression of power and expressive ability, and the leadership, if it is skillful in taking advantage 
of its opportunities, is able to determine which of these bills are good legislation, as well as 
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assuring insuring their passage. This grants both expression and responsible, effective leader-
ship-a leadership that, while not a simple dispenser of services to members, is responsive to 
member needs while creating a responsible agenda. It would be a shame to see this trend reversed 
or destroyed in the name of some anti-democratic call for streamlined government. The value of 
the House is its ability to have its membership heard, and the current House is doing this better 
than ever before while creating opportunities for effective, powerful leadership. If the question we 
ask of ourselves is: what can we realistically expect of House leadership?, then the answer seems 
clear. The leadership is managing to be extremely effective without injuring the expressive 
function of the House. Channelled expression allows for a healthy balance between the ability of 
legislators to be heard and leadership's ability to form and foster responsible legislation. Such a 
structure is valuable, and should be preserved and treasured by the American electorate. 
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